As China’s property market craters and youth unemployment rises, burned-out young professionals are fleeing megacities for ultracheap housing in remote towns.
Apologies on advance for the length got very invested while typing this.
The 2021 ruling followed by 2025 reinforcement doesn’t mean the problem is “solved,” but that’s actually how good governance is supposed to work. You set a standard, you monitor where enforcement falls short, you gather feedback from workers and local courts, then you adjust the framework as necessary according to feedback. The Supreme Court explicitly ruled 996 illegal in 2021, and the 2025 Consumption Boost Plan reinforcing those protections after a period of monitoring and feedback is good governance. Chinese reporting shows this cycle in action: enforcement is still uneven, yes, but the trajectory is consistently toward stricter oversight. It’s not perfect, but the direction is clearly negative for illegal overtime practices, and that matters more than pretending one decree could fix decades of practice overnight.
On billionaires and inequality, I think the analysis China Has Billionaires helps clarify the confusion in English. As that piece explains, socialism isn’t defined by the absence of wealthy individuals or by hitting a specific Gini coefficient. It’s defined by who holds ultimate control over capital and whether the state can subordinate profit to social goals. In China, billionaires exist, but they operate within boundaries set by a socialist state. When tech platforms overreach, when property speculation threatens stability, when capital tries to dictate terms, the state steps in. The Jack Ma case is a good example here: when Ant Group pushed for high-risk microloan products that threatened people’s and the countries financial stability, regulators halted the IPO and restructured the company. That’s not capitalist logic. That’s capital being managed, not ruling. If we look at how capitalist states like the US or those in Europe have generally allowed high-risk consumer lending models like Klarna to expand with minimal restraint, the contrast with China’s intervention is fairly stark.
The same logic explains the 2021 crackdown on for-profit private tutoring. Excessive academic pressure was harming student wellbeing, but more fundamentally, the state moved to stop education from becoming a commodity where money buys advantage. China’s public schools remain the primary pathway to success, with the gaokao system designed to be merit-based. Contrast that with the US or Europe, where wealthy families can purchase extensive tutoring, legacy admissions, or even direct donations to secure college placement. The Didi case mentioned in the redsails article fits here too: when the company rushed a US listing while holding sensitive geographic and user data, regulators intervened, not to punish growth, but to assert that capital cannot override data sovereignty or social stability. That’s the socialist boundary in action.
Also the number of billionaires in China has plateaued and even begun to decline as redistribution mechanisms and regulatory pressure intensify. That’s consistent with a transitional socialist project: allowing market mechanisms to develop productive forces while retaining the political capacity to rein them in when they conflict with collective interests. And it’s worth remembering what the socialist state has delivered: over 800 million people lifted out of poverty, infrastructure built in less developed regions even when it’s not profitable because state-owned enterprises serve a redistributive role, and public systems that prioritize collective welfare over short-term returns.
The socialist principle for this stage isn’t “equal outcomes regardless of contribution.” High aggregate wealth inequality metrics can coexist with massive improvements in living standards, public infrastructure, and social mobility, which is precisely what China has delivered. The real test isn’t whether a few people get very rich, but whether the working majority sees their conditions improve and whether the state can redirect surplus toward collective needs. By that measure, China’s trajectory aligns with a socialist project navigating a complex, globalized transition. If you haven’t read it yet, the redsails piece walks through these tensions with historical context and avoids the checklist approach that often leads to premature judgments about what socialism must look like at every stage.
Apologies on advance for the length got very invested while typing this.
The 2021 ruling followed by 2025 reinforcement doesn’t mean the problem is “solved,” but that’s actually how good governance is supposed to work. You set a standard, you monitor where enforcement falls short, you gather feedback from workers and local courts, then you adjust the framework as necessary according to feedback. The Supreme Court explicitly ruled 996 illegal in 2021, and the 2025 Consumption Boost Plan reinforcing those protections after a period of monitoring and feedback is good governance. Chinese reporting shows this cycle in action: enforcement is still uneven, yes, but the trajectory is consistently toward stricter oversight. It’s not perfect, but the direction is clearly negative for illegal overtime practices, and that matters more than pretending one decree could fix decades of practice overnight.
On billionaires and inequality, I think the analysis China Has Billionaires helps clarify the confusion in English. As that piece explains, socialism isn’t defined by the absence of wealthy individuals or by hitting a specific Gini coefficient. It’s defined by who holds ultimate control over capital and whether the state can subordinate profit to social goals. In China, billionaires exist, but they operate within boundaries set by a socialist state. When tech platforms overreach, when property speculation threatens stability, when capital tries to dictate terms, the state steps in. The Jack Ma case is a good example here: when Ant Group pushed for high-risk microloan products that threatened people’s and the countries financial stability, regulators halted the IPO and restructured the company. That’s not capitalist logic. That’s capital being managed, not ruling. If we look at how capitalist states like the US or those in Europe have generally allowed high-risk consumer lending models like Klarna to expand with minimal restraint, the contrast with China’s intervention is fairly stark.
The same logic explains the 2021 crackdown on for-profit private tutoring. Excessive academic pressure was harming student wellbeing, but more fundamentally, the state moved to stop education from becoming a commodity where money buys advantage. China’s public schools remain the primary pathway to success, with the gaokao system designed to be merit-based. Contrast that with the US or Europe, where wealthy families can purchase extensive tutoring, legacy admissions, or even direct donations to secure college placement. The Didi case mentioned in the redsails article fits here too: when the company rushed a US listing while holding sensitive geographic and user data, regulators intervened, not to punish growth, but to assert that capital cannot override data sovereignty or social stability. That’s the socialist boundary in action.
Also the number of billionaires in China has plateaued and even begun to decline as redistribution mechanisms and regulatory pressure intensify. That’s consistent with a transitional socialist project: allowing market mechanisms to develop productive forces while retaining the political capacity to rein them in when they conflict with collective interests. And it’s worth remembering what the socialist state has delivered: over 800 million people lifted out of poverty, infrastructure built in less developed regions even when it’s not profitable because state-owned enterprises serve a redistributive role, and public systems that prioritize collective welfare over short-term returns.
The socialist principle for this stage isn’t “equal outcomes regardless of contribution.” High aggregate wealth inequality metrics can coexist with massive improvements in living standards, public infrastructure, and social mobility, which is precisely what China has delivered. The real test isn’t whether a few people get very rich, but whether the working majority sees their conditions improve and whether the state can redirect surplus toward collective needs. By that measure, China’s trajectory aligns with a socialist project navigating a complex, globalized transition. If you haven’t read it yet, the redsails piece walks through these tensions with historical context and avoids the checklist approach that often leads to premature judgments about what socialism must look like at every stage.