there are more ways to do signing than paying microsoft boat loads of money… just check a gpg sig file ffs (probably using detached signatures: again, it’s already built into existing tools and it’s a well-known, easily solved problem)
what’s irrelevant is the argument about how the auto update mechanism would work because it already exists
The gpg sig method works great on other operating systems that aren’t Windows or MacOS, but Windows and MacOS do not use that method to verify the authenticity of developer’s certificates.
The update mechanism works fine, but you will not be able to execute the binary on a Windows or MacOS system. The OS will not allow it to run without it being signed.
The malicious actor would not be able to drag and drop their malware in without the Notepad++ certificate. The signature wouldn’t match.
The certificate is not only doing authentication of the developer, but it is also doubling as an integrity check to make sure the code hasn’t been modified.
Windows and MacOS do not use that method to verify the authenticity of developer’s certificates.
completely irrelevant… software authenticity doesn’t have to be provided by your OS… this is an update mechanism that’s built into the software itself. a GPG signature like this would have prevented the hack
The update mechanism works fine, but you will not be able to execute the binary on a Windows or MacOS system
that’s what we’re saying: this update mechanism already exists, and seems to install unsigned software. that’s the entire point of this hack… the technical how it works is irrelevant
I think they want to, but Microsoft has made it expensive for open source developers who do this as a hobby and not as a job to sign their software. I know not too long ago, this particular dev was asking its users to install a root certificate on their PC so that they wouldn’t have to deal with Microsofts method of signing software, but that kind of backfired on them.
the part that we’re arguing against isn’t that a microsoft signing key would have fixed the problem, it’s
No, because you wouldn’t be able to execute the updated exe without a valid signature. You would essentially brick the install with that method, and probably upset Microsoft’s security software in the process.
this update mechanism already exists: it’s the reason the hijack was possible. whatever the technical process behind the scenes is irrelevant… that is how it currently works; it’s not a “what if”
adding signing into that existing process without any 3rd party involvement is both free, and very very easy
which is why this is a solved (for free) problem on linux
the part that we’re arguing against isn’t that a microsoft signing key would have fixed the problem, it’s
I didn’t say a Microsoft signing key is required. Im saying Microsoft requires that you go out and obtain a signed certificate that proves your identity as a developer.
this update mechanism already exists: it’s the reason the hijack was possible. whatever the technical process behind the scenes is irrelevant… that is how it currently works; it’s not a “what if”
The update mechanism was successful hijacked because integrity checks and authentication checks were not properly in place. Notepad++ even said that they moved hosting providers after this happened to them.
saying Microsoft requires that you go out and obtain a signed certificate that proves your identity as a developer
clearly that’s not the case if this was exploitable… again, N++ has an auto update mechanism that they current use. if they used a microsoft signing key to sign a builds hash, this hijack would not be possible
thus they have an update mechanism that works around microsoft signing… how is irrelevant. that is the current state of the software
The update mechanism was successful hijacked because integrity checks and authentication checks were not properly in place
that part we definitely agree on
Notepad++ even said that they moved hosting providers after this happened to them
side note: doesn’t remotely solve the problem… software updates should be immune to this to start with. it’s a problem that the hosting provider was compromised, but honestly we’re talking about a state sponsored hack targeting other states: almost no hosting provider would include this in their risk assessment, let alone shared hosting providers
Can you point out an existing open source application that runs on Windows that only uses GPG signatures?
again, that’s irrelevant… the concept that we’re talking about isn’t even specific to GPG. signing a hash using a private key is basic crypto, and GPG is a specific out of the box implementation
if we remove microsoft signing as an option for whatever reason (which we have) then it’s still very possible, and very easy to implement signed updates into your own custom update mechanism
if we remove microsoft signing as an option for whatever reason (which we have) then it’s still very possible, and very easy to implement signed updates into your own custom update mechanism
If Notepad++ had a valid signing certificate, you wouldn’t be able to run the malicious binary in the update. How is that not relevant?
there are more ways to do signing than paying microsoft boat loads of money… just check a gpg sig file ffs (probably using detached signatures: again, it’s already built into existing tools and it’s a well-known, easily solved problem)
what’s irrelevant is the argument about how the auto update mechanism would work because it already exists
The gpg sig method works great on other operating systems that aren’t Windows or MacOS, but Windows and MacOS do not use that method to verify the authenticity of developer’s certificates.
The update mechanism works fine, but you will not be able to execute the binary on a Windows or MacOS system. The OS will not allow it to run without it being signed.
The malicious actor would not be able to drag and drop their malware in without the Notepad++ certificate. The signature wouldn’t match.
The certificate is not only doing authentication of the developer, but it is also doubling as an integrity check to make sure the code hasn’t been modified.
completely irrelevant… software authenticity doesn’t have to be provided by your OS… this is an update mechanism that’s built into the software itself. a GPG signature like this would have prevented the hack
that’s what we’re saying: this update mechanism already exists, and seems to install unsigned software. that’s the entire point of this hack… the technical how it works is irrelevant
Agreed.
If the updates were signed, then the malicious actor could not push their own updates. It would fail authentication and integrity checks.
yes but as you yourself said
the part that we’re arguing against isn’t that a microsoft signing key would have fixed the problem, it’s
this update mechanism already exists: it’s the reason the hijack was possible. whatever the technical process behind the scenes is irrelevant… that is how it currently works; it’s not a “what if”
adding signing into that existing process without any 3rd party involvement is both free, and very very easy
which is why this is a solved (for free) problem on linux
I didn’t say a Microsoft signing key is required. Im saying Microsoft requires that you go out and obtain a signed certificate that proves your identity as a developer.
The update mechanism was successful hijacked because integrity checks and authentication checks were not properly in place. Notepad++ even said that they moved hosting providers after this happened to them.
Per https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
Can you point out an existing open source application that runs on Windows that only uses GPG signatures?
clearly that’s not the case if this was exploitable… again, N++ has an auto update mechanism that they current use. if they used a microsoft signing key to sign a builds hash, this hijack would not be possible
thus they have an update mechanism that works around microsoft signing… how is irrelevant. that is the current state of the software
that part we definitely agree on
side note: doesn’t remotely solve the problem… software updates should be immune to this to start with. it’s a problem that the hosting provider was compromised, but honestly we’re talking about a state sponsored hack targeting other states: almost no hosting provider would include this in their risk assessment, let alone shared hosting providers
again, that’s irrelevant… the concept that we’re talking about isn’t even specific to GPG. signing a hash using a private key is basic crypto, and GPG is a specific out of the box implementation
if we remove microsoft signing as an option for whatever reason (which we have) then it’s still very possible, and very easy to implement signed updates into your own custom update mechanism
Im not convinced