cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/6817149

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When Prime Minister Mark Carney touched down in Beijing last week, he carried with him the hopes of western Canadian farmers crushed under Chinese tariffs — as well as the frustrations of a nation battered by President Trump’s economic nationalism. The visit, hailed by some as the “Carney Doctrine” and lauded as nuanced diplomacy, offered immediate relief. China signaled flexibility on agricultural restrictions. Trade delegations exchanged pleasantries. For a country bruised by its southern neighbor’s “51st state” rhetoric and Greenland ambitions, the embrace felt validating.

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Beijing understands this dynamic intimately. As this Atlantic Council report documents, China’s economic inducements are strategically designed to align with “the specific needs of recipient countries and their leaders.” The offers are not overwhelming financial packages or corrupt dealings; rather, Beijing “strategically cultivated political and sectoral interests to incentivize” alignment with its objectives. Western Canadian farmers desperate for canola market access represent precisely the targeted constituency China knows how to exploit.

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The immediate appeal is understandable … Yet China’s track record demands extreme caution. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute documented 152 cases of Chinese coercive diplomacy between 2010 and 2020, with sharp escalation after 2018. Trade restrictions, tourism bans, arbitrary detentions, and state-issued threats constitute Beijing’s preferred toolkit. The pattern is unmistakable: countries that deepen economic dependence without maintaining leverage become vulnerable to punishment when their policies diverge from Chinese preferences.

Lithuania discovered this when it opened a Taiwanese representative office; imports collapsed by ninety percent within months. Norway endured years of diplomatic freeze and salmon export restrictions after awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. South Korea suffered $15 billion in tourism losses over THAAD deployment. In each case, the asymmetric dependence China cultivated became the weapon China wielded.

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A Hybrid CoE study of Southeast Asian dynamics reveals this strategy operating at regional scale: China simultaneously employs “carrots and sticks,” rewarding cooperative states while punishing resisters, creating divisions that prevent collective responses to Chinese assertiveness. The Philippines and Vietnam learned that economic inducements came bundled with coercive capacity — tourism restrictions, trade barriers, and maritime harassment deployed tactically against any deviation from Beijing’s preferences.

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A comprehensive economic security framework with Japan, the European Union, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian partners would require patient diplomacy and genuine compromise. It would mean forging agreements harder to negotiate than a Beijing handshake but infinitely more durable. It would demand maintaining American ties despite Trump’s provocations, recognizing that administrations change but geographic realities endure.

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The question now is whether it can recognize the strategic error before the second treat becomes permanently unavailable — before dependence on Chinese markets becomes leverage Beijing deploys at will, and before the coalition of democracies that could have offered genuine security moves forward without Ottawa at the table.

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