It sounds like the federal government can move cases involving federal law enforcement agents performing their duties to federal court.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1442

28 U.S. Code § 1442 - Federal officers or agencies sued or prosecuted

(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.

I think — and I may be wrong — that in a case in federal court, it’d be up to federal prosecutors to prosecute. I don’t know if the Trump administration actually has to prosecute them in that scenario.

Not something that I’ve read up on before, though. I imagine that there are probably articles out there with various lawyers chiming in.

searches more

https://poracldf.org/blog/supremacy-clause-immunity-for-federal-officers/

In short, subjecting federal officers to state criminal sanctions for carrying out their federally appointed duties could make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the federal government to function. Even the most dedicated federal servant would be reluctant to do his job conscientiously if he knew it could mean prison time in the state penitentiary. Seth P. Waxman, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195, 2230-31 (2003).4

In carving out the contours to the federal immunity defense, the courts have established a two-part requirement, adopting in part the Neagle language: “a state court has no jurisdiction if (1) the federal agent was performing an act which he was authorized to do by the laws of the United States and in (2) performing that authorized act, the federal agency did no more than was necessary and proper for him to do.” Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1988).

Significantly, in analyzing the second “necessary and proper” factor, particularly in the context of an agent acting under exigencies, the courts have applied a broad view of the reasonableness of the conduct, focusing “on the intent of the officer and not the actual legality of his action.” Colorado v. Nord, 377 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951 (D. Col. 2005) (emphasizing “a federal officer is still entitled to immunity when he acts in good faith within the general scope of his duties as he understands them;” id. at 950); Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1977) (federal officer seeking immunity need not show that his action “was, in fact, necessary or in retrospect justifiable, only that he reasonably thought it to be”). Just as Neagle involved a murder prosecution, the nature of the state prosecution is not the controlling factor; rather, the only consideration is the intent of the officer in enforcing his federal responsibilities. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes emphasized, “even the most unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the laws of the United States.” Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1920).

As five Ninth Circuit judges agree, not only is the federal immunity provision construed broadly but great leeway is given to a federal agent, so long as the agent is not acting with an evil intent: “when the federal agent is acting reasonably within the broad contours of official duty, and without malice, the courts have employed the Supremacy Clause to protect the agent from prosecution.” Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359 (9th Cir.) (en banc), vacated as moot, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (Hawkins, dissenting).

looks further

Okay, it sounds — and this is just from the phrasing in an article that’s arguing in favor of state charges for one of the ICE situations — like state prosecutors can prosecute even in the case that the prosecution is moved to federal court:

https://prospect.org/2026/01/07/ice-agents-can-be-charged-with-murder/

The history of state prosecutions of federal officials goes back to the War of 1812, when some New England states used state statutes to prosecute federal customs officers who seized goods that were under a trade embargo. Often, they are used to resist a federal law that states don’t like, such as the Fugitive Slave Act.

But numerous states have indicted, charged, and arrested federal law enforcement officers for conduct that exceeded their official duties. In 1898, Virginia charged a federal tax collector posse with shooting and killing horses and cattle during a shootout. The federal posse claimed they were ambushed while attempting to collect taxes.

More to the point, in Findley v. Satterfield (1877), Castle v. Lewis (1918), Oregon v. Wood (1920), Smith v. Gilliam (1922), Maryland v. Soper (1926), and many more, states alleged that federal officers committed murder or attempted murder while engaged in law enforcement activity. Almost always, the federal response was that they were performing federal duties, that they acted in self-defense, or both. Often, these cases were removed to federal court, but the state prosecutors maintained the case. (Federal officers have the right to move cases to federal court, but not the unlimited right; they have to assert some plausible federal defense to the charges.)

He can’t arrest them anymore than you can.